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Abstract
This paper examines the potential and the impact of introducing learning capabilities into au-
tonomous agents that make decisions at run-time about which mechanism to exploit in order to
coordinate their activities. Speciﬁcally, our motivating hypothesis is that to deal with dynamic
and unpredictable environments it is important to have agents that learn the right situations
in which to attempt coordination and the right coordination method to use in those situations.
In particular, the eﬃcacy of learning is evaluated when agents have varying types and amounts
of information when those coordinating decisions are taken. This hypothesis is evaluated em-
pirically, in a grid-world scenario in which a) an agent’s predictions about the other agents in
the environment are approximately correct and b) an agent cannot correctly predict the others’
behaviour. The results presented show when, where and why learning is eﬀective when it comes
to making a decision about selecting a coordination mechanism.
Keywords: Coordination, agent interaction, collaborative agents, reinforcement learning.
1 Introduction
Eﬀective coordination is essential if autonomous agents are to achieve their goals in a multiagent
system (MAS). Such coordination is required to manage the various forms of dependency that
naturally occur when the agents have inter-linked objectives, when they share a common environ-
ment, or when they share resources. To this end, a variety of protocols and structures have been
∗This work was carried out while the ﬁrst author was a member of the Intelligence, Agents, Multimedia Group at
the University of Southampton.
1developed to address the coordination problem. These range from long-term social laws (Shoham
& Tennenholtz, 1992), through medium-term mechanisms such as Partial Global Planning (Durfee
& Lesser, 1991), organizational structuring (Fox, 1981) and market protocols (Malone, 1987), to
one-shot (short-term) mechanisms like the Contract-Net Protocol (Smith & Davis, 1981).
All of these coordination mechanisms have diﬀerent properties and characteristics and are suited
to diﬀerent types of tasks and environments. They vary in the degree to which coordination is
prescribed at design time, the amount of time and eﬀort they require to set up a given coordination
episode at run-time, and the degree to which they are likely to be successful and produce coordinated
behaviour in a given situation. In the majority of cases, these dimensions act as forces in opposing
directions; coordination mechanisms that are highly likely to succeed typically have high set up
and maintenance costs, whereas mechanisms that have lower set up costs are also more likely to
fail. Moreover, a coordination mechanism that works well in a reasonably static environment will
often perform poorly in a dynamic and fast changing one. In short, there is no universally best
coordination mechanism (Galbraith, 1973).
Given this situation, we believe it is important for the agents to have a variety of coordina-
tion mechanisms, with varying properties, at their disposal so that they can select the particular
mechanism that is most appropriate for the task at hand. Thus, for particularly important tasks,
the agents may choose to adopt a coordination mechanism that is highly likely to succeed, but
which will invariably have a correspondingly large set up cost. Whereas for less important tasks,
a mechanism that is less likely to succeed, but which has lower set up costs, may be more appro-
priate. However, to date, the choice of which coordination mechanism to use in a given situation
is something that the designer typically imposes upon the system at design time (e.g. in a given
application a particular social law will be used or it will be decided that all coordination activities
will be handled by the contract net protocol). This means that in many cases the coordination
mechanism that is employed is not ideally suited to the agents’ prevailing circumstances. This
inﬂexibility means that the performance of both individual agents and the overall system may be
compromised. This is especially the case in open and dynamic environments in which agent-based
solutions are often deployed (Jennings, 2000).
To rectify this situation, our aim is to develop agents that can reason about the process of
coordination and then select mechanisms that are appropriate to their current situation. That is,
the choice of coordination mechanism is made at run-time by the agents that need to coordinate.
We claim that ﬁxing on a single coordination mechanism at design time is inappropriate, especially
in dynamic and open contexts, because there is no scope for changing or modifying the mecha-
nism to ensure there is a good ﬁt with the prevailing circumstances (Bourne, Excelente-Toledo,
& Jennings, 2000; Excelente-Toledo, 2003; Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2004). To circumvent
this problem and to achieve the necessary degree of ﬂexibility in coordination requires an agent to
make decisions about when to coordinate and which coordination mechanism to use. To this end,
we have previously developed, evaluated and shown the eﬀectiveness of an agent reasoning frame-
work to achieve this (Bourne et al., 2000; Excelente-Toledo, 2003; Excelente-Toledo & Jennings,
2004). However, this work also highlighted the importance (as well as the diﬃculty) of making good
approximations about the behaviour of other agents. This is especially true as the environment
becomes more dynamic. Given this, a natural extension of the framework is to enable the agents to
acquire knowledge through run-time adaptation. Thus, the agents need to be capable of learning
to make the right decisions about their coordination problem.
More speciﬁcally, here, we deal with the problem of allowing agents to learn the right situation in
which to apply an appropriate coordination mechanism (that has previously been eﬀective in similar
circumstances). In particular, we explore the use of a number of Q-learning algorithms in which the
2amount of information represented in the state varies. We show how this representation impacts
upon the process of making run-time choices about the selection of coordination mechanisms in a
number of diﬀerent scenarios. The reason for this changing state representation is because it models
the key determining factors of the agent’s reasoning framework (i.e. the environmental factors and
the responses of the other agents in the group).
This work advances the state of the art in the following ways. Firstly, it introduces learning
into that part of the agent’s decision making process that is concerned with when and how to
coordinate (agents learn the right situations in which to attempt coordination and the right coor-
dination method to use in those situations). Secondly, it explores diﬀerent state representations
in Q-learning implementation and, more importantly, it analyses the eﬃciency of each in diﬀerent
scenarios regarding coordination decisions. Finally, it empirically demonstrates where the beneﬁts
of learning can be obtained and where learning is not beneﬁcial in this decision making context.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details our speciﬁc coordi-
nation scenario. Section 3 introduces the decision procedures that enable autonomous agents to
dynamically select coordination mechanisms. Section 4 explains how learning is applied to these
decision making procedures. Section 5 introduces the experimental methodology used to perform
a systematic empirical evaluation of the main hypotheses of this paper. Section 6 reports on the
experimental work to evaluate the eﬀect of introducing learning extensions into the agent’s de-
cision making and examines their impact. Section 7 deals with related work and, ﬁnally, section 8
concludes and presents the areas of further work.
2 The Coordination Testbed
The testbed domain is described in more detail in (Bourne et al., 2000; Excelente-Toledo, 2003) (this
includes a detailed justiﬁcation for the choice of this scenario and the various design decisions within
it). Here we just recount the basics that are necessary to understand the subsequent experiments.
Our testbed consists of a grid world in which a number of autonomous agents (Ai) perform tasks
for which they receive units of reward (Ri). Each agent has a speciﬁc task (STi) which only it
can perform; there are other tasks which require several agents to perform them, called cooperative
tasks (CTs). Each task has a reward associated with it, the rewards for the CTs are higher than
those for STs since they must be divided among the m coordinating agents.
The agents move around the grid one step at a time, up, down, left or right, or stay still. At any
one time, each agent has a single goal, either its ST or a CT over which coordination needs to be
achieved. On arrival at a square containing its goal, the agent receives the associated reward. In the
case of STs, a new one appears, randomly, somewhere in the grid, visible only to the appropriate
agent. In the case of CTs, a new one appears, randomly, somewhere in the grid, but this is only
visible to an agent who subsequently arrives at that square. If an agent encounters a CT, while
pursuing its current goal (i.e., its ST), it takes charge of the CT 1 and must decide on both whether
to initiate coordination with other agents over this task, and which coordination mechanism (CM)
it should use or continue working on its ST. In this context, each agent has a predeﬁned range of
CMs at its disposal. Each CM is parameterised by two types of meta-data (see (Excelente-Toledo,
2003) for a mapping of several coordination mechanisms into this framework): set up cost (in terms
of time-steps) and chance of success. For example, a CM may take t time-steps to set up (modelled
by the agent waiting that number of time-steps before requesting bids from other agents) and have
1If several agents arrive at a CT square at the same time, one of them is arbitrarily deemed to be in charge and,
if an agent ﬁnds more than one CT in a given cell, it randomly selects one of them for further analysis.
3a probability, p, of success (thus when the other agent(s) arrive at the CT square, the reward
will be allocated with probability p, with zero reward otherwise). An agent may well decide that
attempting to coordinate is not in its best interests, in which case it adopts the null CM (i.e. the
agent rejects adopting the CT as its goal).
The Agent-in-Charge (AiC) of the coordination selects a CM and, after waiting for the set up
period, broadcasts a request for other agents to engage in coordination. The other agents respond
with bids composed of the amount of reward they would require in order to participate in the CT
and how many time-steps away from the CT square they are situated. If an agent’s bid is successful,
then it is termed Agent-in-Cooperation (AiCoop) to denote the fact that it is a participant (not
AiC) for a CT task. If however, AiC initiates coordination but there is no AiCoops, then, we say
that the AiC failed while attempting coordination. The role Agent-in-ST (AiS) is used to denote
the situation where an agent is working towards a ST. Within this broad framework, Figure 1
highlights the speciﬁc decisions which have to be made (see Section 3 for more details) and gives
the protocol the agents follow at each time-step.
[1] Agents arrive at a square. If AiS arrives at its ST cell, its goal is attained, it
receives the reward and updates its goal. If AiCoop arrives at the CT cell, it
notiﬁes the AiC that it has arrived. The CT is achieved and the rewards are paid
to AiCoops. Note that the reward is only given with probability p, the factor
associated with the CM used to coordinate over the CT.
[2] If AiS ﬁnds a CT it must decide if it wants to become AiC and, if so, which
CM= (t,p) it should use. If t > 0 it must wait t time-steps before broadcasting
a request for coordination. If AiC ﬁnds a new CT, it ignores it.
[3] If AiS receives a request for coordination, it decides whether and what to bid to
participate in the CT. The AiC then evaluates all bids. If AiS’s bid is accepted,
it adopts CT as its new goal. AiC does not respond to requests for coordination.
[4] Each agent decides on its next move according to its current goal and all agents
move simultaneously.
Figure 1: Basic protocol followed by agents.
Agents might receive more than one proposal at the same time step, in which case they reply
with as many bids as the proposals they receive. However, they will only accept one CT contract
at a time. Agreements between AiCs and AiCoops to achieve a particular CT are established via
a contracting protocol. This Contract-Net-like protocol (Smith & Davis, 1981) consists of three
steps. In the ﬁrst step, AiC broadcasts a proposal to all agents. It then waits for the bids. The
second step involves selecting the bids and contracts from AiCs and AiS respectively (evaluation
phase). Finally, the third step consists of the commitment about the terms of the contract and the
time step at which AiCoops will arrive at the CT square.
This initial presentation involves several simplifying assumptions; in particular common knowl-
edge, a deterministic environment and straightforward coordination mechanisms. However, the
framework is also intended to be ﬂexible so that these and other assumptions can be relaxed
(see (Excelente-Toledo, Bourne, & Jennings, 2001) for an example dealing with the dropping of
contracts in order to better exploit new coordination opportunities). To model dynamism, unpre-
dictability and open features in this grid world, the elements in the environment change their values
at execution time. Relevant examples include the changing of the tasks’ rewards (both for STs and
CTs), the frequency with which tasks appear and disappear in the grid, the number of agents in
the environment, and the number of agents needed to achieve a CT. The main consequence of these
4variations is that they generate an environment in which agents face diﬃculty in estimating the
decisions of other agents. Thus, agents have to make decisions based on factors that cannot be a
priori predicted.
3 The Agent’s Decision Making Procedures
In our previous work we have developed and evaluated a decision making framework for reasoning
about whether and how to coordinate in this domain (Bourne et al., 2000; Excelente-Toledo, 2003;
Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2004). Since the main focus in this paper is on the role and impact
of learning on this framework, we do not discuss all the details of the model here. Rather we
concentrate on the decisions where learning could have a role to play; i.e. which CM to adopt, if
any; how much to bid when a request for coordination is received; and how to determine which bid
to accept, if any.
In this context, the agents’ aims are to maximise their reward; in particular their average reward
per unit time. To this end, each agent keeps track of its own average reward, termed its reward
rate, and it uses this rate to decide how much to charge for its own services and, occasionally, to
approximate the expected rates of other agents (when it is not able to build up a picture of them).
Speciﬁcally, each agent uses its reward rate to evaluate and compare the diﬀerent actions available
to it; if it can maintain or improve this rate, it chooses to do so. Of course, this decision model
approximates the true relative values of diﬀerent actions.
3.1 Deciding which CM to select
An agent which, while pursuing its current goal, encounters a CT must decide whether to initiate
coordination with other agents in order to perform it. To do this, the agent must determine whether
there is any advantage in so doing. This depends not only on the reward that is being oﬀered, but
also on the CMs available, as well as on various environmental factors which eﬀect the expected
demands of the potential coordinating agents.
To model the expected demands of the other agents, the AiC assumes they are randomly dis-
tributed throughout the grid, and that their current goals are similarly distributed. Thus some
agents may be near the CT while others may be far away; likewise, for some agents there would be
a signiﬁcant deviation from their ST to reach the CT, while others may be able to coordinate over
the CT en route to their own goals. The agent then assesses the possible CMs on the basis of how
long before the task can be performed and how much reward it is likely to obtain after deducting
the expected reward requirement of the other agents. In the former case, it considers both the set
up time and the average distance away each agent is situated, whereas the latter value is based on
the amount of time agents must spend deviating to their path and the CM’s probability of success.
This assessment determines the amount of surplus reward the agent can expect, over and above
what it expects to obtain during its normal course of operation (i.e., its own average reward per
time-step, r). The agent then selects the CM that maximises this surplus. 2
To formalise this decision procedure, consider an [M ×N] grid with reward size S for STs, and
R for CTs, a coordination mechanism, CMj = (tj,pj), which costs t time-steps to set up and has
a probability of success p. In this grid world of known size, the agent can calculate the expected
average distance (ave dist) away of any randomly situated agent from the CT square as well as the
likely average deviation (ave dev) such agents would have to make to get there.
2Though this may not be a globally optimal criterion for deciding which CM to use, it makes sense from a
self-interested agent’s point of view.
5Based on these ﬁgures, the agent can assess the average surplus reward from coordinating over
the CT at (x,y) using CMj = (tj,pj). First, it must estimate its own cost in terms of how long
the CM will take to set up and how long it expects to wait for the other agents to arrive. Since
the AiC would usually expect to receive S reward units per time-step, the average is calculated as
r = S
ave dist. The cost of CMj is then given by:
costj(x,y) = r × (tj + ave dist(x,y))
Second, the AiC must estimate the average amount of reward the other m agents will require.
When AiC does not have any knowledge of the average reward of all the other agents in the
environment, it uses its own (r) average reward as an approximation. 3
ave bidj(x,y) = m ×
r × ave dev(x,y)
pj
(1)
Third, the AiC estimates the expected surplus (ave payoﬀ) of CMj from adopting the CT by
taking into account the probability of success of the task:
ave payoﬀj(x,y) = pj × R
Using these estimates, the AiC can evaluate the expected surplus reward of adopting CMj:
ave surplusj(x,y) = ave payoﬀj(x,y) − costj(x,y) + ave bidj(x,y) (2)
When deciding which of its CMs to adopt, the agent computes its expected surplus reward from
each of them and selects the one that maximises this value. If the surplus associated with all CMs
is negative, the agent adopts the option of the null CM (which is deﬁned to have zero surplus).
y ↓
1 AiS2
2 CT
3 AiS1
4 ST1
5 ST2
x → 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2: Example of a coordination world grid.
To exemplify this decision procedure, consider the simple scenario of Figure 2 at one instant in
time with two agents (AiS1 and AiS2), two STs, one CT and two CMs: CM1(3,0.9) and CM2(6,1.0).
AiS2 occupies a [5 × 5] grid and ﬁnds a CT requiring one other agent with R = 6 at square [3,2].
The average distance of other agents from [3,2] is 2.6. Since the average distance between two
random squares is 3.2, the average deviation of any agent from [3,2] is 2. Assume that each ST has
3In order to estimate (1) it is assumed that the m is determined in advance or is part of the agent’s knowledge.
However, this assumption may not always be valid for cases in which the number of cooperative agents depends on
the particulars of the coordination’s objective. In such cases, the agents will need to predict this number based on
previous experiences or some how estimate this information (e.g., the straightforward solution is that agents maintain
an average of the number of helpers each time they accomplish coordination; more complex solutions might involve
building a model for each agent each time there is an interaction).
6a reward S = 2, then the average reward per time-step of all agents is 2
3.2 = 0.625. The expected
surplus reward of adopting each CM is given by:
cost1(3,2) = (0.625 × (3 + 2.6)) = 3.5
ave bid1(3,2) =
(0.625 × 1 × 2)
0.9
= 1.389
ave payoﬀ1(3,2) = (0.9 × 6) = 5.4
ave surplus1(3,2) = 0.511
cost2(3,2) = (0.625 × (6 + 2.6)) = 5.375
ave bid2(3,2) =
(0.625 × 1 × 2)
1.0
= 1.25
ave payoﬀ2(3,2) = (1.0 × 6) = 6
ave surplus2(3,2) = −0.625
Under these circumstances, AiS2 decides to attempt coordination with CM1 (becoming AiC)
because it expects to obtain a proﬁt. Note this is not the case with CM2, where the negative result
indicates there is not likely to be a surplus. Thus, in this case, if AiS2 only had CM2 at its disposal
it would choose the null CM (expected surplus zero) and it would continue towards its ST.
3.2 Deciding what to bid to become an AiCoop
When agents receive a request to participate in a CT they submit a bid based on the amount of
reward that they would require to compensate them for deviating from their current goal. Thus, an
agent’s required reward is determined by the amount of time spent in deviating to the CT square,
its average reward per time-step and the probability of success of the CM being proposed. 4
To formalise this, consider an agent, Ai, with average reward per time-step ri. The agent
calculates its deviation (i.e., the number of extra time-steps it requires to reach its ST if it goes
via the CT square). Note that if, for example, the CT square lies directly on a path to the ST,
the agent’s deviation would be zero. Clearly, such an agent will be in a position to submit a very
attractive bid, since the cost of coordinating is eﬀectively zero.
Again by means of illustration consider the agents depicted in Figure 2. AiS1 at [5,3] would
take 4 time-steps to reach ST1 at [2,4] directly, but 6 steps going via the CT at [3,2], a deviation
of 2 time-steps. However, AiS2 at [1,1] would take 7 time-steps to reach ST2 at [4,5] directly, and
also 7 steps going via the CT at [3,2]; AiS2 therefore has a deviation of 0.
To compute the reward AiSi requires from engaging in coordination over the CT, it takes into
account the compensation both for its deviation and for the possibility that the CM might fail.
Thus, the estimation of bid by agent i to participate in coordination is given by:
bidij =
ri × deviationi
pj
(3)
4Note that the AiSs use the actual values of the concepts discussed, whereas the AiC’s task is to make a good
approximation of these components through equation (1).
7The agent submits its bid to coordinate and its distance from the CT square. If an agent is
selected to coordinate, it adopts the CT as its current goal. Its ST is only re-adopted after the CT
has been accomplished.
3.3 Deciding which AiS bids to accept
Once the AiC has received bids from all agents, it selects the set that maximises its surplus reward,
given the new (deﬁnite) information it has received (cf. the approximation in section 3.1). For each
agent, Ai, the AiC knows the amount of reward it will require (bidij) and the time it will take to
arrive (Ti).
The AiC’s selection bid process is based on the calculation of the cost of each bid received.
However, when more than two agents are required to achieve a CT, it is necessary to deal with the
fact that an AiCoop may have to wait in the CT cell while the remaining AiCoops arrive (because
agents have to travel diﬀerent distances). There are many ways of dealing with this situation (see
discussion below). However to simplify the estimates of expected reward undertaken by the various
agents, it is assumed the AiC pays an additional reward for the time elapsed. Thus, AiC knows
the number of time steps that each AiCoop is likely to have to wait (speciﬁed in the bid) and the
amount it will pay for waiting time at a speciﬁc predeﬁned waiting rate (q). The CT is achieved
only when the AiC has received the conﬁrmation of all m agents involved in the cooperation. When
an AiCoop notiﬁes the AiC of its arrival at the CT cell, it either receives its share of the CT reward
or the waiting rate followed by its share of the CT reward.
Thus, to decide which bids to accept, the general idea is that AiC selects the m proposals with
least cost (from the total bids received B). It does this by considering the reward requested in the
bid and the waiting time cost (cost bid) and then it estimates its expected reward given this cost
and its investment. Formally, AiC calculates the cost of each subset b of B with m elements of the
form (bidij,Ti). From each subset b, AiC selects the agent that will take the longest time to arrive
(i.e., maxTb = max(bidij,Ti)∈b[Ti]), then it can determine the maximum time that each agent will
spend in the cell. Finally, it approximates the cost of each bid based on the reward and the waiting
time an AiC has to pay:
cost bidb =
X
(bidij,Ti)
(bidij + (maxTb − Ti) × q)
Bringing all this together, AiC estimates the surplus it expects to obtain by taking into account
the cost of the selected bids and its own investment to wait for the last AiCoop to arrive. The bids
selected belong to the subset b of B that maximizes the surplus given by:
surplusj = pj × R − cost bidb − r × (tj + maxTb) (4)
Now, it may be the case that no bids are received that give a positive surplus. Even though
the chosen CM had an expected surplus, by chance it may be that no agents are suﬃciently near
to provide reasonable bids. In such a situation, the AiC abandons the CT and returns to its ST.
In this paper, the main focus is on giving the agents the capability of learning to make the
right decisions about their coordination problem. That is, we wish to endow the agents with
the capability of learning the right situation in which to apply the right coordination mechanism.
Speciﬁcally, the agent’s decision making framework presented in this section and, in particular, the
decision procedure outlined in section 3.1 (equation (2)), allows agents to make decisions about
when and which CM to select in order to achieve a CT. Thus, this is the major one with respect to
8reasoning about coordination mechanisms (Bourne et al., 2000; Excelente-Toledo, 2003; Excelente-
Toledo & Jennings, 2004) and it is, therefore, the one we concentrate on in terms of evaluating the
role of learning as described in the next Section. 5
4 The Role of Learning
Our investigation focuses on the use of reinforcement learning (RL) (Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore,
1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) in coordination. A reinforcement-based approach is appropriate
because we are concerned with agents pursuing goals and obtaining rewards according to how
eﬀectively those goals are accomplished. Within this class, Q-learning (Watkins & Dayan, 1992)
was chosen because it is an online algorithm that does not require a model of the environment and
thus it is well suited to our dynamic and unpredictable scenario.
In this study, each reinforcement learning agent uses a Q-learning algorithm. In general terms,
an agent’s objective is to learn a decision policy that is determined by the state/action value
function. The classical model of Q-learning consists of:
• a ﬁnite set S of states s of the world (s ∈ S);
• a ﬁnite set A of actions a that can be performed (a ∈ A);
• a reward function R : S × A → r.
An agent’s goal consists of learning a policy π : S → A that maximises the expected sum of
discounted rewards V :
V [rt + γrt+1 + γ2rt+2 + ...] = V
∞ X
i=0
γirt+i
where 0 ≤ γ < 1 is the discount factor. Formally speaking, the discount factor determines the
value of future rewards in the following way: a reward r received t time steps in the future is worth
only γt times what it would be worth if it were received immediately. As γ approximates 1, the
function takes future rewards into account more strongly. Thus, the agent’s task is to learn the
optimal policy π (i.e. argmaxπ V π(s), ∀(s)).
In more detail, assume that an agent always performs the cycle of being in a particular state s,
then selecting and performing an action a that causes the agent to enter a new state s′ and receive
an immediate payoﬀ (reward r(s,a)). The Q-learning algorithm is based on the estimated values
of the agent’s state (s)-action (a) pairs, called Q(s,a) values. Based on this experience, the agent
updates its Q(s,a) values using the formula:
Q(s,a) ← Q(s,a) + α[r + γ × max
a′ Q(s′,a′) − Q(s,a)] (5)
where α is the learning rate which determines the rate of change of the estimation and, maxa′ Q(s′,a′)
is the value of the action that maximises the Q function at state s.
However, there is still the problem of how agents select their next action to execute. They have
to balance their decision between selecting an action that, when exploited in the past, brought
5There are other places where learning could play a role; for example, an agent might learn the decision about
how much to bid to become an AiCoop (equation (3)) or which bids to accept (equation (4)). However, these options
are out of the scope of this paper.
9about a positive reward, and an action that has not yet been explored and that consequently has
an unknown reward (“exploitation versus exploration”) (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In this work, we
use a ǫ-greedy function that selects the action with the highest Q(s,a) value once all the actions
have been explored a pre-determined number of times. In particular, we use f(Q(s,a),n) (Russell
& Norvig, 1995) which determines how greed (preference for high values of Q(s,a)) is traded oﬀ
against curiosity (preference for low values of n, namely, actions that have not been tried before).
Formally speaking, the exploration function equates to:
f(Q(s,a),n) =
￿
R+ if n < Ne
Q(s,a) otherwise
(6)
where n is the number of times Q(s,a) has been visited, R+ is the optimistic estimate of best
possible reward that an agent can obtain in a given state and Ne corresponds to the number of
times that agents should try a particular action-state pair.
In summary, for experimental evaluation purposes, agents use a Q-learning algorithm with the
following values: γ is assigned with value 0.01 which means that the agent is trying to maxi-
mize immediate reward; α is decreasing with time by calculating it with the number of times a
Q(s,a) value is visited visits(s,a): α = 1
1+visits(s,a); the Q(s,a) values are initialised with 0. And
equation (6) is used as the exploration function. 6
Thus, the main objective is then to evaluate the eﬀect of learning on the agents’ decision making
about CMs. To do this, we will compare the performance of agents that use a Q-learning algorithm
(RL) with those that perform no learning (NL). Here the key diﬀerence is how the agents select the
CM with which they will attempt coordination (step [2] in the protocol speciﬁed in Figure 1). For
the remaining steps of the protocol, both RL and NL agents employ the decision making procedures
outlined in section 3 to make agreements when surplus (equation (4)) is positive given the set of
bids (equation (3)) it received.
This means then that when dealing with RL agents, the agent-state corresponds to the abstrac-
tion of the particular situation that agents experience when a CT is found (for example, the agent
role and the position in the grid); the agent-action represents the set of options an agent has at
its disposal (i.e. the set of coordination mechanisms it can select, including the null CM) and the
reinforcement is modelled as the reward obtained by selecting the particular CM or not selecting
a CM at all. Thus, the idea is that with Q-learning the agents will eventually learn the policy
(after exploring suﬃcient situations) that allows them to know which CM to choose given a speciﬁc
situation/state.
Now, for the purposes of this analysis, NL and RL agents experience one of the the following
outcomes: i) a successful coordination (i.e. the AiC selects a CM, ﬁnds AiCoops to coordinate
with and the CT is successfully achieved using the CM selected); ii) the AiC initiates coordination
with a selected CM but there are not enough successful bids to make agreements (this means that
attempting coordination with the CM was a failure); and iii) the AiC does not select any of the
CMs at its disposal (i.e. the null CM is selected and the agent continues with its individual problem
solving activity).
On the basis of previous description, the learning agent’s main objective is then to select the
most suitable CM given its prevailing circumstances. To achieve this general goal, we explore the
use of two Q-learning algorithms: RL1 and RL2. The main diﬀerence between them is in the way
6It is well known that the convergence time is determined by the exploitation and exploration function, the size
of the look up table and the learning rate (Singh, Jaakkola, Littman, & Szepesvari, 2000). Here, it was not our
objective to hand tune all these parameters to reduce the convergence time in particular cases. Rather, we ﬁxed the
values of all parameters and kept them constant in all Q-learning implementations.
10they model the state representation at the moment when the decision about which CM to select
is taken. In particular, our interest is in evaluating whether agents can improve their performance
by explicitly representing one of the key components of the decision making of the CM, namely
the ave bid (equation (1)). 7 Thus, RL2 agents employ a Q-learning algorithm that does estimate
and use ave bid when selecting the CM, whereas RL1 does not model this information in its state
representation.
Thus, in what follows, we ﬁrst describe the general RL algorithm and then we detail the diﬀer-
ences between RL1 and RL2. Finally, we discuss the algorithm followed by the NL agents.
RL: When a learning agent ﬁnds the CT, it performs the following basic cycle:
[1] It is in a particular state (represented by s)
[2] It makes a decision about the next action (a) to execute using the exploitation and exploration
function of equation (6).
[3] The agent executes the selected action (a) which will be one of accomplishing a CT (if a CM
is selected and successful), failing on a CT (if a CM is selected and unsuccessful), or selecting
no CM (if the null CM is selected) and reaches a new state s′.
[4] It obtains a reinforcement reward as a result of the execution of action a. In particular, the
reinforcement varies with the following outcomes:
• The CT is accomplished using the CM selected. In this case, a positive reinforcement is
obtained that is based on the reward gained by achieving the CT after the payment to
the AiCoops and the time invested in pursuing the task.
• The CT failed given the CM chosen. This situation occurs because no one replies to the
request for coordination or because the reward requested to participate in the cooperative
action by the AiCoops is too high for the AiC to accept it (i.e. the surplus (equation (4))
is negative). In either case, a negative reinforcement is calculated based on the average
reward (r) lost in the time invested in the CM (t).
• The null CM is explored or exploited. Here, the reinforcement corresponds to the re-
ward (CT reward) the agent might have obtained by investing an average time in a CT
(modelled by average distance ave dist).
[5] It updates the Q(s,a) value (equation (5)).
[6] It goes to [1].
Turning now to the diﬀerences between the learning agents and taking previous descriptions of
RL we have two variations: RL1 and RL2 agents. Each of them will be dealt in turn.
• RL1: An agent learns to select a CM by exactly following the RL algorithm and, in particular,
it uses its role and position in the grid when the CT is found as the representation of s.
• RL2. An agent learns to select a CM using ave bid. An agent of this type follows RL but has a
modiﬁed state representation s and a diﬀerent means of updating to s′ in step [4]. Speciﬁcally,
7Recall that ave bid represents the prediction of other agents’ bids with which agents attempt coordination.
11s is modelled with the agent’s role, its position in the grid and the expected ave bid. 8 The
initial estimation of ave bid in step [1] corresponds to:
ave bidj(x,y) = m × r × ave dev(x,y)
Note that the only diﬀerence between this formulation and equation (1), is that pj (the
probability of success of a given CM) is unknown at this stage.
When RL2 agent reaches a new state s′, the state is updated with the ave bid using equation (1)
where pj refers to the probability of success of the CM chosen.
NL: A non-learning agent makes decisions entirely based on the decision making procedures detailed
in Section 3 and follows the protocol speciﬁed in Figure 1. Being precise, when an agent ﬁnds a CT,
it calculates the expected average surplus (equation (2)) of each CM at its disposal. It then simply
chooses the one with the best ave surplus. For the next stages of the protocol, it uses equations (4)
to decide which bids to accept and (3) to become AiCoop. Note that the NL agent uses equation (1)
to calculate ave bid in order to evaluate ave surplus for each of the CMs.
To ﬁnish the discussion on the role of learning in this model, it is necessary to specify the
features of the environment in which the algorithms will be tested. Two scenarios have been
designed: scenario1 in which all AiSs in the environment become AiCoop by submitting a bid which
is calculated by equation (3) and scenario2 in which AiSs calculate their bids in the same way but
they vary the result by a random factor. The reason for this change is that, in the general case,
AiCs face a great deal of uncertainty in predicting this value. Thus the random element mirrors
environments in which predictions are less accurate. Together, these two scenarios constitute a
reasonably static environment in which good predictions can be made and a more dynamic one in
which predictions are inherently less accurate.
Bringing this all together, the agents’ performance will be analysed using the following algo-
rithms:
RL1 agents learn to select a particular CM according to the proﬁt gained by accomplishing CTs
with a particular CM.
RL2 agents learn to select a particular CM according to the accuracy with which they calculate
the ave bid.
NL agents select a particular CM using equation (2).
5 Evaluation Methodology
The main hypothesis we seek to evaluate is whether agents coordinate more eﬀectively in our
scenario using the reinforcement based algorithms. To measure such beneﬁts in our model, a
set of experiments have been designed as a formal methodology to provide information about the
experimental variables. In order to test and to verify the hypothesis questions we employ statistical
inference methods; in particular analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to test hypotheses about
diﬀerences between the means collected. The null hypothesis (H0) of equal means can be rejected
when the procedure reveals for all experiments that the diﬀerences among means are signiﬁcant
8To simplify the state representation, ave bid is in fact associated with a range of values. Given the values of the
simulation variables (see Section 5.1), the ranges of the ave bid are the following: 1 <ave bid< 1.84, 1.84 ≥ave bid<
2.64 and ave bid≥ 2.64.
12(p < 0.05) or might be accepted in the contrary case (Cohen, 1995). In other words, ANOVA
tests the signiﬁcance of the observations by accepting or rejecting the hypothesis formulated. The
observations are the set of values for the experimental variables as the result of the execution of a
particular algorithm in a given environment.
ANOVA explains the relationships between groups by analysing all possible interactions among
them. However, though it provides an answer to the hypothetical questions by indicating if the
mean of the groups are equal or not, it does not indicate the relations between them (for example,
which mean of which groups are the highest). Thus, in most cases, it is necessary to go a step
further (post-analysis) to determine where the exact diﬀerences among the means occur between
groups. This procedure consists of running a post-test to explore the data collected on a case
by case basis (this is termed pairwise analysis) because it tests the diﬀerence between each pair
of means. 9 This pairwise analysis is particularly important in those cases where more than two
procedures are being tested (or one procedure is tested in more than two scenarios). In concrete
terms, the post-test makes a comparison between the data collected and builds groups (as many as
necessary) that have statistically homogeneous values. Each group is generated with an associated
value (the p value) that indicates the degree of conﬁdence from which each group was built.
For the purposes of the experimental evaluation presented in Section 6, all the hypotheses are
evaluated with ANOVA and only the cases that involve more than two experimental variables are
subject to a post evaluation. When we test two variables and ANOVA rejects the equality of
means, the data collected is used to indicate the relationship between the two variables. We are
also interested in determining which of the groups obtains the highest mean (from now on referred
to as the winner group) because it represents the agents with the best performance.
5.1 Experimental and simulation variables
The following simulation variables were ﬁxed for all learning experiments: size of the grid ([10×10]),
duration (500,000 time units) 10, number of CTs in the grid at any one time (3), number of agents
in the environment (5), ST reward (1), CT reward (20), maximum number of agents needed to
achieve a CT (3), coordination mechanisms considered by an agent (CM1= (1,0.6), CM2= (15,0.7),
CM3= (30,0.8), CM4= (45,0.9) and CM5= (60,1.0)) 11.
The experimental variables on which the analysis is based are: total agent reward obtained from
its ST and CT tasks (AU), total agent reward obtained by agents in the Agent-in-ST role (AiS), total
agent reward obtained by agents in the Agent-in-Charge role (AiC), total agent reward obtained
by agents in the Agent-in-Cooperation role (AiCoop) and, the total number of CTs accomplished
(TCT). The experiments described collect the results of the experimental variables averaged over
10 simulation runs.
9Several statistical tests exist to perform this analysis. The one used here is called Tukey’s honestly signiﬁcant
diﬀerence (HSD). This was chosen because it lies in the middle of the spectrum of alternatives; between LSD (which
stands for least signiﬁcant diﬀerences) and Scheﬀ´ e tests which are the extreme in the conservative methods (Cohen,
1995; Lane, 2001).
10We decided to evaluate over a ﬁxed duration because in this scenario time counts and agents win reward at
each time-step. Thus, it is reasonable to compare the behaviour of all algorithms under the same parameters. The
duration selected is suﬃcient for the learning algorithms to converge to optimal values.
11These CMs were selected because previous results have indicated that these are the main ones that are selected
by the agents in this setting (Bourne et al., 2000; Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2002; Excelente-Toledo, 2003).
135.2 Evaluating hypotheses
To accept our main hypothesis, the hypotheses presented below must be rejected (meaning that the
hypothesis of equal means is false) and the values of the experimental variables of a particular lear-
ning algorithm should produce signiﬁcantly better results than those obtained with NL. Therefore,
the following hypotheses must be tested in scenario1 and scenario2:
H1: the AU obtained by performing a reinforcement based algorithm (RL) is the same as that
obtained by agents which use the NL algorithm.
H2: the number of CTs (TCT) achieved by agents by means of either reinforcement learning
algorithm is identical to that of agents using NL.
H3: the AU obtained by RL1 is the same as that of RL2 (evaluated in the case where H1 rejected).
H4: the number of CTs accomplished by RL1 is identical to that of RL2 (evaluated in the case
where H2 is rejected).
6 Experimental Evaluation
The experimental evaluation undertaken in this section follows the methodology described previ-
ously and is organised in the following way. Firstly, the four hypotheses of Section 5.2 are tested
in a static environment (Section 6.1) and secondly the same evaluation procedure is followed but
in a dynamic environment (Section 6.2).
Table 1: Agent’s AU and TCT in scenario1.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H1: AURL1=AURL2=AUNL 0.000 Rejected NL, RL2( )
H2: TCTRL1=TCTRL2=TCTNL 0.000 Rejected RL2(  )
H3: AURL1=AURL2 0.000 Rejected RL2
H4: TCTRL1=TCTRL2 0.000 Rejected RL2
( ) see Table 2 and (  ) Table 3 for details.
6.1 Selecting CMs in static environments (scenario1)
To start with, Table 1 and Figure 3 present a summary of the results obtained by performing
ANOVA on the data collected by each of the algorithms in scenario1. Let’s ﬁrst analyse the
agent utility hypothesis. H1 is rejected, meaning that the performance of the algorithms does
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the AU obtained. In order to understand the relationship between the
algorithms a post-analysis of H1 is conducted (Table 2). The conclusion is that the performance of
NL and RL2 is better by a statistically signiﬁcant amount (AUNL = 88,018.64, AURL2 = 87,570.24)
than RL1 (AURL1 = 81,064.28). Furthermore, comparing the performance of RL1 and RL2 in H3
(Rejected), it is concluded that the diﬀerent mechanisms used for learning do eﬀect the AU obtained
by agents. Figure 3 graphically shows that the reward gained by RL2 agents is better than that for
RL1 agents. Moreover, it can also be concluded that an agent which learns to select the CM (RL2)
performs the same as one which does not learn at all (NL).
H2 and H4 evaluate the eﬀectiveness of achieving CTs. Both hypotheses are rejected which
means that the total of CTs achieved does depend on the algorithm executed. In this case, the
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Figure 3: Contrasting agent’s abilities in scenario1.
more CTs that are accomplished, the better the AU that is obtained. Here NL and RL2 agents
accomplish more CTs than RL1 and, consequently, they gain more reward (see axis Y of Figure 3
and the result of the post-analysis regarding TCT in Table 3). However, this is an important result
to analyse in detail, because a high number of CTs achieved, does not necessarily mean that an agent
performs better. This argument can be seen by observing Tables 2 and 3 (Figure 3 graphically shows
the same information). Here, despite the fact that RL2 agents achieved statistically the highest
number of TCT (three groups were formed in the post-analysis), their AU gained is not higher than
that obtained by NL agents (RL2 and NL agents belong to the same group in Table 2). Actually,
the results of applying ANOVA to the TCT achieved and AU gained by NL and RL2 corroborate
this explanation and are shown in Table 4. Speciﬁcally, H5 shows that the total reward obtained
by RL2 is the same as that obtained by agents using the NL algorithm (H5 is accepted, there is no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the AU), whereas H6 demonstrates that the total number of CTs
achieved by NL agents is identical to the TCTs accomplished by RL2 agents (H6 is rejected, the
TCT obtained by each algorithm is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent).
From the results obtained in the previous experiment it can be seen that in this scenario, the
agent’s optimal behaviour is achieved by ﬁrstly taking the correct decision about when to attempt
coordination. And, secondly, by selecting the CM whose time to set up is balanced by the amount
of reward obtained. Moreover, RL2 and NL are the ones that make decisions which maximise their
AU. Thus, to better understand the diﬀerences or similarities between RL2 and NL, Table 5 tests
ANOVA by agent role with the following hypotheses:
H7: the AU obtained by Agents-in-ST role which perform a reinforcement based algorithm (RL2)
is the same as that obtained by AiS agents which use the NL algorithm.
H8: the total reward obtained by RL2 agents in the Agent-in-Charge role is the same as that
obtained by NL AiC agents.
H9: the AU obtained by RL2 Agents-in-Cooperation role (AiCoop) is identical to the total reward
obtained by NL agents in the AiCoop role.
15Table 2: H1 in scenario1: post-analysis.
Agent AU
1 2
RL1 81,064.28
RL2 87,570.24
NL 88,018.64
p 1.000 0.791
Table 3: H2 in scenario1: post-analysis.
Agent TCT
1 2 3
RL1 1,465.62
NL 1,805.90
RL2 1,922.20
p 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 4: Contrasting RL2 and NL agents in scenario1.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H5: AURL2=AUNL 0.594 Accepted none
H6: TCTRL2=TCTNL 0.000 Rejected RL2
Figure 4 illustrates these results. They indicates that while RL2 AiC is signiﬁcantly better than
the corresponding NL agent role (H8 rejected), NL AiS is better than RL2 AiS (H7 rejected). H9
is accepted which means that the two agents accomplish similar rewards in their AiCoop role. As
can be seen, both agent types achieve (statistically speaking) the same AU (recall that H5 was
accepted) but from diﬀerent sources. In this experiment, the best AiC (as a result of accomplishing
more CTs) does not mean more reward is obtained. This is because high AU might have originated
from fewer and more proﬁtable CTs (in the case of NL) or a high number of less rewarding tasks
(in the case of RL2). In terms of selection of the CMs, this means that NL selected those with
higher probability of success and higher time to set up (less time to achieve CTs), while RL2 agents
choose those CMs with less time to set up but less probability of success.
Table 5: Contrasting RL2 and NL agent’s role AU in scenario1.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H7: AiSRL2=AiSNL 0.009 Rejected NL
H8: AiCRL2=AiCNL 0.000 Rejected RL2
H9: AiCoopRL2=AiCoopNL 0.546 Accepted none
Whereas the previous discussion only compared RL2 and NL agents, in what follows, we under-
take a similar analysis but considering all three algorithms. To this end, Table 6 and Figure 4 show
the result of the data collected and Tables 7, 8 and 9 present the post analysis performed to H10,
H11 and H12 respectively.
H10: the AU obtained by Agents-in-ST role which perform a reinforcement based algorithm (either
RL1 or RL2) is the same as that obtained by AiS agents which use the NL algorithm.
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Figure 4: Contrasting agent’s roles abilities in scenario1.
H11: the total reward obtained by RL1 and RL2 agents in AiC role is the same as that obtained by
NL AiC agents.
H12: the AU obtained by RLs Agents-in-Cooperation role (AiCoop) is identical to the total reward
obtained by NL agents in the AiCoop role.
Table 6: Agent’s role AU in scenario1.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H10: AiSRL1=AiSRL2=AiSNL 0.000 Rejected NL( )
H11: AiCRL1=AiCRL2=AiCNL 0.000 Rejected RL2(  )
H12: AiCoopRL1=AiCoopRL2=AiCoopNL 0.000 Rejected NL, RL2(   )
( ) see Table 7, (  ) Table 8 and (   ) Table 9 for details.
As expected, the ﬁrst thing to notice is that the results are consistent with those described in
Table 5. This is because NL and RL2 agents have superior performance in all three roles when
compared against RL1 (H10, H11 and H12 are rejected). This means, the performance of RL1
agents do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the experimental variables. NL still performs better than
the others in terms of taking advantage of pursuing STs (i.e. by not attempting a cooperative
activity (H10 rejected)). Turning to the analysis of the cooperative behaviour, here the results of
Table 5 show that RL2 is the agent which performs the best as an AiC (H11 is rejected) and (RL2
and NL) obtain the same as an AiCoop (H12 is rejected as both agents have statistically speaking
the same results). Generally speaking, it can be seen that RL2 and NL better balance their decision
of when to go for the CT with the CM which allows them to gain more reward.
When considering the two learning based algorithms, it is clear that those agents that take into
account the ave bid of other agents (RL2) perform better than those that do not (RL1). Thus H3
and H4 are rejected in Table 1 and RL2 is the winner in both cases. Moreover, the information
provided by the policies learnt by RL2 is more informative. For example, both agents learn that
the optimal action when agents are in the corner of the grid (position [1,10]) is to select CM1.
17However, with RL2, agents additionally learn that this is the action to execute if and only if the
ave bid is higher than 2.64. Generally speaking, the optimal policy with RL2 might vary for each
of the diﬀerent values of the ave bid, whereas with RL1 this information cannot be extracted from
the policies because it is not explicitly represented.
Table 7: H10 in scenario1: post-analysis.
Role to analyse: AiS
Agent AU
1 2
RL1 60,475.28
RL2 62,136.72
NL 64,899.00
p 0.124 1.000
Table 8: H11 in scenario1: post-analysis.
Role to analyse: AiC
Agent AU
1 2
NL 10,192.50
RL1 10,615.21
RL2 12,641.40
p 0.346 1.000
Table 9: H12 in scenario1: post-analysis.
Role to analyse: AiCoop
Agent AU
1 2
RL1 9,973.79
RL2 12,792.12
NL 12,927.13
p 1.000 0.746
Contrary to our intuitions, neither of the learning agents perform better than NL. One reason
for this conclusion is that an NL agent performs well because it uses a decision making process
that models reasonably well the various actions that take place in a static environment. In other
words, NL agents use equation (1) to predict the possible bids the other agents will make to
participate in a cooperative task. And, as it turns out, this estimate is not far from the real bid
they eventually make. The second reason is that the results for the learning based algorithms
were obtained considering a ﬁxed period that included the exploitation and exploration phase, not
once the learning agents had converged to the optimal policy (equation (6)). Recall that agents
in the learning process need to try the CMs (exploration) even though some of them are not
necessarily worth it (since this is a necessary step in the task of learning). To this end, it could be
argued that if we allow RL agents to compete with NL agents once they know in which situation
they should select which CMs, their performance would improve. Actually, it turns out to be the
case (we have veriﬁed that when agents are initiated with the policies they have learnt from the
past experiment, they perform signiﬁcantly better than the corresponding NL agents (these issues
have been thoroughly explored in (Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2003))). Speaking more generally,
18NL agents require knowing a priori what the regularities of the domain will be, whereas the learning
agents can perform successfully as long as regularity exists. However, despite this improvement, we
consider it very unlikely that agents will be able to take advantage of the knowledge learnt when
the environment is in a constant state of ﬂux. In such cases, it is not valid to assume that agents
will continue behaving in similar ways or that the interaction will take place with the same agents
they encountered before. In such scenarios, it will be more diﬃcult to ﬁnd NL agents that can
accurately predict the other’s behaviour and it is very unlikely that agents can successfully use the
same decision making framework. Thus, for these reasons, we believe our agents should be capable
of adapting their decision making as a result of what is occurring in the environment, i.e. during
acting in more demanding scenarios. Therefore, our objective is to design agents that inhabit open
and dynamic environments and we require the learning agents to show a superior performance
when considering both the exploring and the exploiting phases. Thus, in what follows, the use of
learning is further explored in situations in which one of the fundamental actions associated with
cooperative activity is more challenging to predict (scenario2).
6.2 Selecting CMs in dynamic environments (scenario2)
Turning now to the more dynamic environment of scenario2. We tested the same basic set of
hypotheses (H1, H2, H3 and H4) and the results are summarised in Table 10 and Figure 5. First,
we analyzed the hypotheses related with AU. Similar to the results obtained in Table 1, we conclude
that applying RLs and NL produces distinctive results. But, conversely to Table 1, RL2 agents get
signiﬁcantly better results (AURL2 = 75,952.66) than RL1 agents (AURL1 = 73,690.06) and RL1
agents get a signiﬁcantly higher AU than NL agents (AUNL = 68,333.94). These results are clear in
Figure 5 and the relationship between the groups is shown in Table 11. What is more, regarding the
diﬀerences in the agents’ performances shown by the learning algorithms (H3), the results are once
again that the AU of RL2 agents are signiﬁcantly higher than those accomplished by RL1 agents.
Table 10: Agent’s AU and TCT in scenario2.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H1: AURL1=AURL2=AUNL 0.000 Rejected RL2( )
H2: TCTRL1=TCTRL2=TCTNL 0.000 Rejected NL(  )
H3: AURL1=AURL2 0.000 Rejected RL2
H4: TCTRL1=TCTRL2 0.200 Accepted none
( ) see Table 11 and (  ) Table 12 for details.
With reference to the TCT accomplished, the hypotheses of equal means of H2 and H4 are
rejected. Figure 5 shows on its Y axis the total CTs accomplished by agent type. As can be seen,
there is a signiﬁcant impact on the TCT achieved when performing RL or NL; the results obtained
by RLs are in the range of 30% less than those obtained by NL (Table 12 illustrates that after
the post-analysis, RL agents accomplish (statistically speaking) the same number of CTs). The
relevant aspect to discuss now, though, is that in contrast to previous experiments, NL obtains a
lower AU despite achieving more CTs. This corroborates our previous explanation about the correct
selection of the CM and its repercussions for the agent’s performance. To this end, Table 13 and
Figure 6 show the results of testing ANOVA for the next hypotheses, as we did in scenario1:
H10: the total reward obtained by Agents-in-ST role which perform a RL algorithm (either RL1 or
RL2) is the same as that obtained by AiS agents which use the NL algorithm.
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Figure 5: Contrasting agent’s abilities in scenario2.
H11: the AU obtained by RL1 and RL2 agents in AiC role is the same as that obtained by NL AiC agents.
H12: the AU obtained by RLs Agents-in-Cooperation role (AiCoop) is similat to the total reward
obtained by NL agents in the AiCoop role.
Table 11: H1 in scenario2: post-analysis.
Agent AU
1 2 3
NL 68,333.94
RL1 73,690.06
RL2 75,952.66
p 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 12: H2 in scenario2: post-analysis.
Agent TCT
1 2
RL1 686.54
RL2 697.46
NL 889.46
p 0.392 1.000
The results are as follows. The reward gained by achieving CTs by the cooperative roles NL-
AiC and NL-AiCoop are higher than those gained by the corresponding RL roles because they achieve
more CTs (H11 and H12 are rejected and Tables 16 and 17 show how the agents compare with one
other). However, the time invested in the CTs and the reward gained from them was not suﬃcient
to match the reward gained by RL AiSs (RL-AiSs obtained approximately 88% of the total reward
by accomplishing STs and NL-AiSs achieved 74%). Accordingly, the reward gained by achieving
ST tasks is the largest part of the total reward and NL accomplishes much fewer ST tasks than
20RLs. Thus, regarding the test of individual performance, H10 is rejected and RL2 is the agent
type winner (Table 15 presents the distribution of the data collected regarding AiS roles). The
reason for this result is that agents might invest a signiﬁcant amount of time on the CM and, in
the end, the AiCoops often request higher bids than those in scenario1 (meaning the AiCs’ proﬁt
is reduced). With NL, it seems that the AiCs cannot make good enough predictions of ave bid.
Therefore they attempt coordination (or the AiC might even fail after the evaluation phase) even
though the proﬁt obtained after achieving the CT was not as high as the reward that was being
gained by RL-AiSs. However, it is important to observe that the solution is not to avoid the CT
tasks and only pursue STs in scenario2. Rather, the answer is to ﬁnd the right balance between
the two because in this scenario CTs always provide better rewards than STs. Thus, RL agents
perform better because they are more certain about when to invest time in a CT with the correct
CM and, more importantly, when not to do it (because it is not worth it). They then use this time
to take advantage of pursuing STs.
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Figure 6: Contrasting agent’s roles abilities in scenario2.
Table 13: Agent’s role AU in scenario2.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H10: AiSRL1=AiSRL2=AiSNL 0.000 Rejected RL2( )
H11: AiCRL1=AiCRL2 =AiCNL 0.000 Rejected NL( )
H12: AiCoopRL1=AiCoopRL2=AiCoopNL 0.000 Rejected NL(   )
( ) see Table 15, (  ) see Table 16 and (   ) Table 17 for details.
As this set of experiments shows, learning agents can take advantage of knowing which CM to
apply in this more demanding environment. However, it is also important to evaluate how agents
which employ the various reinforcement based algorithms compare with one another. To start
with, the type of learning algorithms followed by the agents do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
TCT (i.e. no matter how they learn to select the CM, agents still accomplish the same number
of CTs (H4 is accepted and both algorithms formed one group in the post-analysis of Table 12)).
However, RL2 performs better when evaluating AU (H3 is rejected). This is because the reward
21obtained per agent role indicates that RL2 agents perform better than RL1 in this environment. To
this end, Table 14 shows the results of testing H13, H14 and H15 which read as follows:
H13: the total reward obtained by RL1 AiS agents is the same as that obtained by AiS agents which
use the RL2 algorithm.
H14: the AU obtained by RL1 and RL2 agents in AiC role is the same.
H15: the total reward obtained by RLs Agents-in-Cooperation role (AiCoop) is identical.
From the results of Table 14 it can be seen that the roles that have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
AU are AiC and AiS (H13 and H14 are rejected), whereas the AiCoop role does not make a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence to the ﬁnal AU obtained (H15 is accepted). The explanation for this result is that RL2
agents are able to better balance their decision making about when to attempt coordination even
though there is a signiﬁcant degree of uncertainty about the outcome. This is achieved when
an agent makes decisions about the CM based on the others’ cooperative behaviour (which is
exactly what is being modelled by RL2). Thus, although at ﬁrst it might seem a bad performance
to accomplish more STs than any other agent type, when these results are combined with the
results of the other roles, it is clear that RL2 agents show a better performance than RL1. This is
supported with the evidence that the biggest reward is gained by AiS agents and the reward gained
by cooperative roles is the smallest amount.
Table 14: Agent’s role AU in scenario2.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome Winner
H13: AiSRL1=AiSRL2 0.000 Rejected RL2
H14: AiCRL1=AiCRL2 0.000 Rejected RL1
H15: AiCoopRL1=AiCoopRL2 0.400 Accepted None
Table 15: H10 in scenario2: post-analysis.
Role to analyse: AiS
Agent AU
1 2 3
NL 50,599.18
RL1 64,547.90
RL2 66,911.98
p 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 16: H11 in scenario2: post-analysis.
Role to analyse: AiC
Agent AU
1 2 3
RL2 3,796.33
RL1 3,999.72
NL 12,295.16
p 1.000 1.000 1.000
22In conclusion, it is not diﬃcult to see that while in scenario1 the NL agents could accurately
predict the amount requested from others for engaging in a CT, this was not the case for the more
unpredictable environment of scenario2. As a result, agents might not only select an inappropriate
CM, but they may also attempt coordination when this is not the best thing to do. Therefore,
the optimal policy varies from attempting coordination less frequently than in a static environment
to not attempting coordination at all. This is supported by the fact that the TCT gained by all
agent types in scenario2 is considerably lower (TCT has a mean of 757.82) than the amount accom-
plished in scenario1 (TCT mean of 1,738.24). Being more concrete, if the NL agents’ predictions of
ave surplus are too low (being optimistic about the possible future cooperative agents), they will
always initiate coordination even in situations where it not the best decision to make. However,
if their predictions are too high (being pessimist) they will never attempt coordination. Thus, we
can conclude that having learning agents that exploit and explore the CMs is the most reasonable
thing to do in dynamic environments because agents cannot be certain about the others’ actions.
Generally speaking, in dynamic and unpredictable environments RL agents perform better than
NL agents because they are more certain about when to invest time in a CT and, more importantly,
when not to do it (because it is not worth it). RL agents then use this time to take advantage of
pursuing STs. Moreover, incorporating the ave bid in the learning process helps RL2 agents to have
a more precise model of what is occurring in the environment and, consequently, their decision
making is improved. This, in turn, means the agents are more eﬀective at maximising their proﬁts.
Table 17: H12 in scenario2: post-analysis.
Role to analyse: AiCoop
Agent AU
1 2
RL1 5,142.44
RL2 5,244.35
NL 5,439.59
p 0.060 1.000
7 Related Work
There are two broad strands of work that are primarily related to our model and each will now be
dealt with in turn:
• work on reasoning about coordination and
• work on multiagent learning.
In terms of coordination, most existing work assumes it is a design time problem (e.g., (Shoham
& Tennenholtz, 1992; Smith & Davis, 1981; Durfee & Lesser, 1991; Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994)).
Thus, comparatively little work addresses run-time reasoning about the selection of particular coor-
dination protocols. Among those that do deal with this issue, a variety of research positions have
been investigated related to how ﬂexibility can be introduced in diﬀerent aspects and at diﬀerent
levels of coordination. However, from the perspective of this work, these can all be classiﬁed as
introducing ﬂexibility into particular cases of coordination mechanisms or in a somewhat restricted
manner.
23In more detail, Durfee (Durfee, 1999) has argued that agents need the ﬂexibility to coordinate at
diﬀerent levels of abstraction, depending upon their particular needs at a given moment in time. To
date, however, this work has focused on building such ﬂexibility into the basic planning mechanisms
of the individual agents. As yet, there are no mechanisms for explicitly reasoning about which level
to coordinate at in a given situation. Such ﬂexibility was also built into cooperative problem
solving agents by Jennings (Jennings, 1993). Here, agents could choose to cooperate according to
various conventions which dictated how they should behave in a particular team problem solving
context. These conventions varied in terms of the time they took to establish and the communication
overhead they imposed upon the agents. However, again, there was no reasoning mechanism for
determining which convention was appropriate for a given situation. Barber et al. (Barber, Han, &
Liu, 2000) present a software engineering framework that enables agents to vary their coordination
mechanisms according to their prevailing circumstances. They also identify criteria for determining
when particular mechanisms are appropriate. However, the decision procedures for actually trading-
oﬀ these criteria are not well developed. Boutilier (Boutilier, 1999) presents a decision making
framework, based on multi-agent Markov decision processes, that does reason about the state of
a coordination mechanism. However, his work is concerned with optimal reasoning within the
context of a given coordination mechanism, rather than actually reasoning about which mechanism
to employ in a particular situation.
In terms of the work on learning, a vast literature has been produced in recent years concerning
the use of learning techniques (particularly Q-learning) in multiagent systems (Sen & Weiss, 1999;
Stone & Veloso, 2000). The focus has been mainly on two aspects. In the ﬁrst one, an agent’s goal
is to learn about the other agents or their environment in order to predict their behaviour or to
produce a model of them (Nagayuki, Ishii, & Doya, 2000; Hu & Wellman, 1998; Claus & Boutilier,
1998). Generally speaking, this strand of work deals with creating an explicit representation of
other agents in order to predict their actions so that an agent can take more informed decisions in
the future. In the second case, Q-learning has been applied to learn how to coordinate or cooperate
to achieve common goals by using speciﬁc strategies (Tan, 1993; Sen, Sekaran, & Hale, 1994). The
success in these two lines of research has mainly been to improve the cooperation or coordination
between the agents in the environment. While this is clearly an important issue to address, we
are more concerned with learning to select particular coordination mechanisms. To date, however,
there has been comparatively little work concerned with learning which CM to select in a given
context.
The most relevant work to our own -regarding coordinarion is the COLLAGE (Prasad & Lesser,
1999) and LODES (Sugawara & Lesser, 1998) systems. The objective in both systems is to improve
coordination by learning to select a coordination strategy in appropriate situations. However the
aspects each system addresses are diﬀerent and their ﬁndings are complementary. LODES is more
interested in having agents capable of learning the key information that is necessary to improve
coordination in speciﬁc situations. In COLLAGE agents learn how to choose the most appropriate
coordination strategy given a particular situation. Thus, LODES focuses on “what information
to learn” and COLLAGE on “learning the situation where to use a coordination strategy”. It is
important to notice that both systems are concerned with the detailed activities of coordination as
part of the learning process. For agents to solve a particular coordination problem, they have to
solve all the interrelations and dependencies between their actions. Thus agents ﬁrst plan the actions
to perform and then execute them. To solve this, both systems have to handle deep knowledge:
about the domain in the case of LODES and about coordination strategies with COLLAGE. In our
case, however, the research aim is broadly similar, but our assumptions are diﬀerent and we deal
with the problem using alternative solutions.
24In our framework, agents are endowed with a set of decision making procedures to select ade-
quate coordination mechanisms. By dealing with an abstract set of such mechanisms, we consider
it more important to have agents that have the capacity to make decisions about coordination,
rather than dealing with all problems might occur among the interactions speciﬁc interaction. We
leave the latter to the details of the subsequent tasks of the associated protocol. Furthermore,
we believe that as agents are increasingly being required to deal with more dynamic issues then
online learning will become more important. COLLAGE, by contrast, uses instance based learning
techniques in which there is a phase of recovery of examples and one of training. Consequently, the
system has well deﬁned moments in which these phases are performed which gives the additional
problem of determining when each phase should ﬁnish.
In more recent research, Garland and Alterman (Garland & Alterman, 2001, 2004) propose the
use case-based planning and learning probability estimates to allow agents to better coordinate. In
particular, agents do learn on-line from past experience so that they take more informed decisions
about which plan is “the” appropriate to execute in a particular coordination problem. In this work
however, the learning outcome is to improve the decision making about planning, communication
and adaptation of plans. This point of view is diﬀerent from ours where it is assumed that planning
is one instance of a CM and then the question to answer is whether planning should be selected in
a speciﬁc circumstance.
In our previous reasearch work we have shown that autonomous agents that make run-time
decisions about the most appropriate mechanism to coordinate their activities exhibit better per-
formance than those that do not (Excelente-Toledo, 2003; Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2004).
However, although the agents’ coordination decisions are more eﬀective and eﬃcient, as the envi-
ronment becomes more dynamic and unpredictable, there is a greater need to exhibit behaviour
that is tailored to the agents’ prevailing problem solving context. Thus, (Excelente-Toledo & Jen-
nings, 2002) and (Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2003) present a preliminary evaluation of how such
ﬂexibility can be achieved through learning and adaptation (speciﬁcally using Q-learning). How-
ever this work does not deal with modelling others’ bids in the state representation and, moreover,
it does not explore the eﬀects of taking into account this key component of the agent’s decision
making.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper analysed the use and the eﬃcacy of agents learning to make better decisions about how
to coordinate more eﬀectively. We showed that learning does indeed improve the decision making
when agents are uncertain about the other agents’ actions. This improvement occurs because
the agents learn to recognise the situations where the most proﬁtable actions must be selected.
We build upon (Excelente-Toledo & Jennings, 2002) to demonstrate that the more informed the
decision making about the possible agents to coordinate with, the better the cooperative outcome.
We also showed that learning was less eﬀective when agents operate in more static environments in
which they can make reasonably accurate predictions about their environment and other agents.
In order to focus on the learning issue, some knowledge is assumed in the framework about the
agents and the scenario. However, one of the assumptions in this work is that the environment in
which the decision making takes place is dynamic, open, and heterogeneous and agents face great
diﬃculty when taking coordinating decisions. This is because in such environments it is impossible
to enumerate in advance the wide variety of contexts in which coordination is likely to be needed. In
fact, agents face a signiﬁcant challenge even to know what agents are present at any given moment;
because agents can enter and leave the system at any time (openness), because the system and
25its components are in a continuous state of change (dynamism), or because the agents themselves
exhibit diﬀerent behaviour, have diﬀerent capabilities and have their own agenda (heterogeneity).
In these cases, it is especially important to have agents that are capable of automatically tailoring
their coordination decisions to respond to the prevailing context. Examples of such systems are
Web applications, e-commerce systems and grid computing application.
Speaking more generally, we believe it is important to develop techniques that enable agents to
coordinate ﬂexibly in dynamic and unpredictable environments. Although several of the detailed
aspects of the decision procedures are speciﬁc to our grid-world scenario, we believe that the general
processes and structures we developed are suitable for reasoning about coordination mechanisms in
more general domains (see (Excelente-Toledo, 2003) for several examples of how the scenario can be
mapped into a variety of real world problems including transportation problems and coordinated
information retrieval) 12. In particular the issues of how to exploit learning techniques to allow
agents to make decisions based on their experience is a key aspect that needs broader investigation.
We believe that the results presented here among others can be viewed as an important ﬁrst step
in that direction.
For the future, the aim is to extend the use of learning to cover other aspects of the agent’s
decision framework; such as to learn the decision about how much to bid in a request for coordination
(Section 3.2), when to become an AiCoop (Section 3.1) and which bids to accept (Section 3.3). It is
also intended to allow agents to construct models of one another and to have the ability to vary the
details of this modelling according to the agent’s coordination context. In particular, it is believed
that in order to accomplish more eﬀective learning objectives, agents should model the others as 1-
level agents (using the terminology of (Vidal & Durfee, 1997)) by explicitly representing knowledge
about others or about the eﬀect of their interactions. In this paper, we are addressing only part
of the problem by assuming that the actions performed by other agents alter the environment that
the agent is perceiving and sensing. Thus, agents do not explicitly model the behaviour of others.
It is important to address this aspect because most of the agent’s decisions take into consideration
predictions about the other agents and to reﬁne these predictions an agent needs to represent in a
more precise way the behaviour of the others in the scenario. In a broader context, a ﬁnal aspect
to discuss is that learning can also be employed to learn the meta-data parameters of the CM (i.e.
the CM’s parameters could be reﬁned given the eﬃciency of the CMs actual execution).
12In (Excelente-Toledo, 2003) we mapped our grid world scenario into a package delivery problem (Rosenschein &
Zlotkin, 1994) where trucks are the agents that move around the grid with parcels to deliver at speciﬁc locations.
The ﬁnal destinations for their parcels correspond to the agents’ speciﬁc tasks. There are special packages (a package
being a group of parcels) that have to be delivered by more than one truck (because of their size) and these correspond
to CTs. The truck’s goal is to deliver a number of parcels to speciﬁc locations. The more parcels delivered by a truck,
the more proﬁt it receives. Similarly, the coordinated information retrieval domain consists of having a number of
agents with the task of downloading documents from speciﬁc locations in the Internet (Huhns & Stephens, 1999).
The action of downloading has an associated cost that represents the price paid for the use of the server. The agent’s
objective is to reduce, as far as possible, the cost of downloading. Each time an agent has a document to retrieve,
it might download it by itself or it could minimise the cost by coordinating its activities with those of other agents
that are also interested in the same document.
In both exemplar applications, all the concepts and constituent factors of the decision making framework discussed
in Section 3 were mapped into the formulations with only minor changes. This endeavour highlights the fact that
the scenario and framework portrays and describes the key coordinating processes that can be found in concrete
applications domains (as well as the more generic testbed) meaning that the framework does indeed have a broader
applicability. And most probably, depending on the domain, some additional concepts (the truck space for example in
the transportation domain) will need to be incorporated or modelled more precisely (in the coordinated information
retrieval domain, the use of real time could have been employed instead of the routing connection). However, those
concepts that have already introduced represent the major ones in which many examples can be mapped and tested
and are not speciﬁc to the grid world scenario outlined in this work.
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